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'Considering Social Sustainability in Company law Reform: Corporate Goals and 
Organisational Innovations' 
Lorraine Talbot* 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the primary corporate goal (profit maximisation) is posited on 
the FRPSDQ\·V capacity to extract value from labour.  Accordingly, it is not that the company needs 
different mechanisms to encourage it to be more cognisant of social sustainability but that its very success 
is posited upon an affront to social sustainability. Furthermore, in order to extract value from labour and 
to avoid the costs involved in achieving this it will innovate organisationally. Innovation often means that 
companies will shed their corporate network in favour of an outsourcing model of production. 
Problematically, this takes the socially harmful activities of the company away from the ambit of company 
law and the effects of company law reform. I hope to demonstrate the process and motivation for 
organisational innovation through the double lens of &RDVH·V transaction cost theory and labour value 
theory.  
 
Shareholder maximization is mandated in the UK under the Companies Act 2006, section 1721. 
The other stakeholders on the list2 differ in their likelihood to be attended to when directors are 
acting for the benefit of company members. The environment, given a social interest in this and 
the impact of CSR may be well attended to. Not so labour. The truth of this contention may in 
part be illustrated by musing upon a more radical reformulation of section 172 which replaces 
the phrase ¶PHPEHU·s interest· with ¶ODERXUV· interest· an enlightened labour value model. Such a 
reform would be nothing short of alarming because it fundamentally deconstructs the current 
institutional form and goals of the company. As a matter of social norms companies exist for the 
benefit of shareholders, not employees. Companies exist to utilise labour to make money for 
                                                 
* Dr Lorraine Talbot, Warwick University 
1 Section 172 of the 8.¶V Companies Act 2006 states that ¶$ director of a company must act in 
the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to ² D· ² 
(f). This can be seen as a form of instrumental stakeholding or enlightened shareholder value, in 
that it may enhance VKDUHKROGHUV· interests to consider a wider group of constituents when 
making decision-making, equally it may not.  
2 Set out in section 172 (a)-(f) 
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shareholders. The enlightened shareholder value approach of section 172 distorts this truth a 
little, the stakeholder approach distorts it a lot3 but the labour formulation clarifies the essential 
function of companies by offering such an ² from the mainstream point of view ² unpalatable 
alternative.  
My aim in this paper is to show that companies continually innovate their organisational forms 
in order to extract maximum value from labour; a point I demonstrate by examining the 
organisational forms taken by multi-national companies (MNCs) through the lens of &RDVH·V 
transaction cost theory and through a labour based interpretation of &RDVH·V theory. 
Organisational adaptability means that law reform which attempts to inhibit the FRPSDQ\·V 
primary goal can be sidestepped. Thus I examine labour governance initiatives which may be 
able to attach to companies regardless of organisational restructuring. 
 
How companies extract value:  MNCs, Coase and transaction costs theory   
Use of foreign subsidiaries by UK based parent companies has been evident since the end of the 
nineteenth century.4 However, use of complicated corporate networks of parent and subsidiary 
companies massively intensified over the last forty years of globalisation. The global economy of 
MNCs is organized around some 80,000 parent companies and 800,000 subsidiaries.5 Within 
this, the largest companies ¶KDYH their own internal operations and employees spread over 40 or 
more nations, and may boast of thousands of supply chains and strategic ¶SDUWQHUV· ZRUOGZLGH·6 
There is an increased tendency for companies in the developed world to relocate the productive 
part of their business to developing countries. This expresses a global shift in production 
patterns where developing country subsidiaries will engage in the lower skilled part of 
                                                 
3 Because ¶WKH interest of PHPEHUV· is already ensured through such quarters as the equities 
market where the valuation of shares (and thus the measure of management competency) is 
based on the expected returns to shareholders.   
4 Bartholomay Brewing Company (of Rochester), Limited v Wyatt, Respondent. Noel Dynamite Trust 
Company, Limited, Appellants; v Wyatt, Respondent.[1893] 2 Q.B. 499 The London Bank of Mexico 
and South America, Limited v Apthorpe.[1891] 1 Q.B. 383  
5 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ´3URWHFW 
Respect and 5HPHG\µ Framework 
<www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf > 
6 Farok J. Contractor, Vikas Kumar, Sumit K. Kundu and Torben Pedersen ¶5HFRQFHSWXDOLVLQJ 
the Firm in a World of Outsourcing and Offshoring: The Organizational and Geographical 
Relocation of High-Value Company )XQFWLRQV· (2010) Journal of Management 1417,1428 
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production (such as assembly work) and the developed FRXQWU\·V company will manage 
production utilising skilled local labour. Apple famously assembles its products in China, taking 
advantage of cheap labour,7 a profitable strategy despite the bad publicity it has received.8 All 
MNCs by definition have a global corporate network, however some retain all or most of their 
operations within the network while others will rely more on outsourcing.  Illustrating the latter 
model, Associated British )RRGV· subsidiary Primark bought directly from one of the clothes 
factories involved in the disaster in Dhakar where 1,129 people were killed. 9  Many of the 
extractive industries utilized the former model, safe in the knowledge that parent company assets 
were protected from its VXEVLGLDULHV· losses by the corporate veil.10  
The decision to engage in economic activity either within organizational structures or within the 
market was first explained by Coase in his 1937 article. 11  Here he showed that as market 
conditions were not perfect,12 obtaining goods and services from the market entailed transaction 
costs. As these costs increased it became more efficient to bring these arrangements in house 
thus forming a business organization or ¶ILUP· where resources could be efficiently allocated by 
the ¶HQWUHSUHQHXU
 The size of the firm was really a measure of how much it outperformed the 
market.  
                                                 
7 $SSOH·V products are mainly produced and assembled by Foxconn (owned by Taiwanese 
company Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd) and its China-based subsidiaries. 
www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0068.html (accessed 1 Dec. 2013)  
8 /www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2422763,00.asp (accessed 1 Dec. 2013)  
9 Emma Rowley, ¶%DQJODGHVK factory collapse: Primark to pay FRPSHQVDWLRQ· (Telegraph 29 
April)  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/10026307/Bangladesh
-factory-collapse-Primark-to-pay-compensation.html >(accessed December 1 2013)  
10 Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch.433. Since Adams many plaintiffs who suffered injury from 
employment in subsidiary companies of extractive industries have sought compensation from 
parent companies in tort. This approach easier today because the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
can no longer be used in the UK (as a Contracting State to the Brussels Convention) to decline 
jurisdiction over a case on the grounds that the court of a non-Contracting State would be a 
more appropriate forum and since the decision in Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA 525 which 
found that the parent company owed a duty of care to the employee of a subsidiary. 
11 5RQDOG&RDVH¶7KH1DWXUHRIWKH)LUP·4 Economica 386²405  
12 Oliver Williamson later showed that as the market consisted of flawed and complicated 
individuals with bounded rationality and prone to act opportunistically it necessarily 
encompassed inefficiencies. Oliver Williamson The Economic Institutions of &DSLWDOLVP·(The Free 
Press 1985) 
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An alternative way of conceptualizing the processes described in &RDVH·V transaction cost theory 
is to say that firms or companies emerge because they more effectively extract value from labour 
than does the market. Within the firm, ODERXU·V time is organized so as to maximize its 
productivity ² the division of labour being a typical method for maximizing labour productivity.  
There are costs for capital in the organisation of production in this way, but those costs are off-
set by higher returns. As  William Lazonick observes, ¶LW was the closer supervision of the 
workers afforded by the factory setting that, despite its higher capital costs, ultimately made it 
more profitable than domestic LQGXVWU\·13 The organisational features of the company, which in 
particular encompass the idea of authority and hierarchies, are successful precisely because they 
enable the exercise of power by capital over labour.  
 
Modern thinking on transaction costs: Labour exploitation and outsourcing 
&RDVH·V transaction cost theory has been utilized by recent management scholarship to set out 
the conditions under which ¶ILUPV· (usually MNCs) will opt for outsourcing in preference to a 
network of subsidiaries and vice versa. Some studies conclude that transacting costs in 
developing countries are too high for significant outsourcing to be viable. A tendency to social 
instability or ¶HQYLURQPHQWDO G\QDPLVP· will increase market inefficiencies and the costs of 
transacting. For example, significant social flux may render contracts unenforceable or local 
suppliers may be able to act opportunistically and charge higher than market prices because their 
local knowledge is superior. To counter this companies outsourcing will need to increase 
monitoring which will create additional costs. 14  Other studies indicate that as developing 
countries supply such cheap labour, the benefits to MNCs are still significant provided that 
labour is utilized in the low skilled part of production. Transaction costs will arise if the 
outsourced labour is engaged at the high technology end of production because, it is argued, 
high technology is vulnerable to theft of intellectual property in a way that low skilled production 
is not.15  
                                                 
13  William Lazonick Business Organisation and the Myth of the Market Economy (Cambridge University 
Press 1994, first edition 1991) 187 
14 Cher- Hung Tseng and Liang-Tu Chen ¶)URm Capabilities as Moderators of transaction cost 
factors and subsidiary domestic RXWVRXUFLQJ· (2013) 51(1) Management Decision 5, 10 
15 ibid 
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The barriers to extracting value from labour in the studies noted above appear to be rapidly 
dissipating because of innovations in organisational structuring and management technique 
which are enabling outsourcing of higher end production in developing countries. For example, 
research indicates that the ¶FRUH· areas that an MNC needs to protect have become increasingly 
condensed. Pharmaceutical companies will keep the ¶science· of experiments within the core 
company (the parent) but outsource the preparation of test batches. This part comprises around 
40% of R&D budgets but does not compromise the protection of key knowledge. 16  
Furthermore, high level knowledge outside of the core is fragmented by design so that elements 
of the productive process that can be outsourced ¶YHU\ close to the ´core competenciesµ of the 
ILUP·17 Corporate knowledge is also more codified so that it can be transferred throughout the 
organisation. Transfer of knowledge enables outsourcing but it also (potentially) enables theft of 
corporate knowledge. Codified knowledge, broken into discrete portions enables more 
outsourcing and ¶may not greatly increase the threat of RSSRUWXQLVP·18 
 
Global outsourcing continually grows as companies are driven to innovate ways of extracting 
value from labour.19  Slicing production in the ways described above allows the ¶FRUH· knowledge 
to be trimmed down and for outsourcing to increase its reach in the search for appropriate 
labour. New corporate strategies have increased the tasks that may be undertaken by outsourced 
labour without compromising the FRPSDQ\·V intellectual property. This changes the shape of 
companies so that ¶WKH ILUP·V boundaries have become more permeable while its geographical 
scope has LQFUHDVHG· 20  The development of different management strategies are liberating 
business from the need to have complicated corporate networks and to outsource more 
effectively. This makes social reform through company law reform tricky because increasingly 
                                                 
16 Farok J. Contractor, Vikas Kumar, Sumit K. Kundu and Torben Pedersen ¶5HFRQFHSWXDOLVLQJ 
the Firm in a World of Outsourcing and Offshoring: The Organizational and Geographical 
Relocation of High-Value Company )XQFWLRQV· (2010) Journal of Management 1417,1423 
17 ibid 1419 
18 ibid 1423 
19 One study looked at 1722 offshore projects undertaken from 2002 to 2005 by MNCs and 
concluded that the EU15 was the least attractive area for such projects while China and India 
were the most favoured locations. Demirbag, M. and Glaister, K. W. ¶)DFWRUV determining 
offshore location choice for R&D projects: a comparative study of developed and emerging 
UHJLRQV· 2010 Journal of Management Studies 1467 
20 Farok J. Contractor, Vikas Kumar, Sumit K. Kundu and Torben Pedersen ¶5HFRQFHSWXDOLVLQJ 
the Firm in a World of Outsourcing and Offshoring: The Organizational and Geographical 
Relocation of High-Value Company )XQFWLRQV· (2010) Journal of Management 1417,1428 
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transactions do not take place within same corporate network and are instead a series of 
contracts.   
 
Operationalising sustainability through labour-orientated governance 
 
Labour-orientated governance requires ODERXU·V empowerment through the unions, through their 
presence on a supervisory and management board and through control over their working 
practices and conditions throughout the value chain. Traditionally, the power to shape labour-
orientated governance resided with labour unions and their role certainly remains significant. 
However, as the experience of the UK and US car industry indicates, strong unions may fall-stall 
wage cuts and redundancies and resist changes to working practices, but market pressures and 
anti-union state policy mean that unions cannot resist them indefinitely. 21  Direct labour 
engagement with decisions about the productive process would enable labour to engage 
creatively with reskilling and restructuring, rather than just defend outdated practices. Labour 
representation in the corporate decision making process, though such mechanisms as the 
supervisory board, would enable this.   
Labour representation and protection throughout the chain of production may also be facilitated 
by private labour governance initiatives (civil-society initiated codes of conduct in respect of the 
treatment of labour). Some codes have the potential to protect labour in the value chain 
regardless of whether it is outsourced labour or labour within a corporate network. However, to 
meet that potential such codes must contain specific requirements rather than general principles, 
they must meaningfully involve stakeholders and have an external monitoring system. These base 
requirements are absent from most labour governance initiatives such as the Ethical Trading 
Initiative (used by Primark in Dhakar), ISO 26000 to promote CSR in companies,22 the UN 
Global Compact23 and 5XJJLH·V Guiding Principles.24 However, other initiatives do conform to 
the base standard of specificity, engagement and monitoring. One such example is the Social 
Accountability 8000 (SA 8000), originally developed by Social Accountability International in 
                                                 
21 L E Talbot Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century (Routledge 2012) 58-66 
22  International Organization for Standardization, ´,62 2600- Social 5HVSRQVLELOLW\µ  
<http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm> accessed June 26th 2013 
23 http://www.unglobalcompact.org 
24 John Ruggie, ¶*XLGLQJ Principle on Business and Humna Rights: Implementing the United 
1DWLRQ·V ´3URWHFW Respect and 5HPHG\µ )UDPHZRUN· http://www.business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf > 
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1998, to reduce sweatshop practice. SA8000 is highly regarded by many commentators and 
considered to be ¶RQH of the most stringent certification standards in the area of labour 
JRYHUQDQFH·25 The current 2008 version SA8000 states as its purpose to ¶SURWHFW and empower 
all personnel within a FRPSDQ\·V scope of control and LQIOXHQFH·26 This includes producers, 
suppliers, subcontractors and home workers. To be certified, SA8000 requires detailed auditing 
to ensure that its very specific standards and requirements are met and are verifiable.  
SA8000 also requires stakeholder engagement, through consultation and engagement 
ZLWKLQIRUPDWLRQUHODWLQJWRFRPSOLDQFHLQFOXGLQJPRQLWRULQJ7KHFRPSDQ\PXVW¶GHPRQVWUDWH
its willingness to participate in dialogues with all interested stakeholders, including, but not 
limited to: workers, trade unions, suppliers, subcontractors, sub-suppliers, buyers, 
nongovernmental organisations, and local and national government officials, aimed at attaining 
VXVWDLQDEOHFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKLVVWDQGDUG·27 All companies will be subject to announced or 
unannounced audits to certify compliance and they must keep appropriate records to show 
compliance.28 Social Accountability International reports that SA8000 is currently certifying 3231 
facilities in 68 countries, over 65 different industries, employing a total of 1,829,776 workers. 29 
However, HYHQWKLV¶JRRG·H[DPSOHKDVEHHQVXEMHFWWRsubstantial criticism.  The Clean Clothes 
Campaign reported that SA 8000 was failing to deliver because it was not  easily enforcable and 
                                                 
25 Jimmy Donaghey, Juliane Reinecke, Christina Niforou, Benn Lawson, ¶From Employment 
Relations to Consumption Relations: Balancing Labor Governance in Global Supply &KDLQV·  
Human Resource Management Forthcoming, 2014. More recently though, even this ¶JRRG· example 
has been subject to criticism in respect of its lack of enforcebility and because of its failure to 
monitor the agencies qualified to certify a business as SA8000 compliant. The Clean Clothes 
&DPSDLJQ¶)DWDO Fashion Analysis of recent fcatory fires in Pakistan and Bangladesh: a call to 
protect and respect garment ZRUNHUV· OLYHV· 
<http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/fatal-fashion.pdf >24-27 
 
26 Social Accountability International Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000)  <http://www.sa-
intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf> 4 
27 ibid 10 
28 ibid 
29 SA8000 Certified Facilities List, June 30, 2013 
<http://www.saasaccreditation.org/certfaclists/2013_Q2/Q2%202013%20SA8000%20Certs%
20List,%20Public%20List.pdf> 
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because of its failure to monitor the agencies qualified to certify a business as SA8000 
compliant.30 
 
Research has also indicted that these labour governance initiatives are more effective when 
coupled with other supporting elements. Donaghey et al find that although labour and consumer 
power operate on different areas of governance, if they work simultaneously they can enhance 
the effectiveness of labour governance.31  There are potential connections between many diverse 
activists around the company which may enhance labour governance by creating a pincer effect 
that may force companies to modify their shareholder primacy orientation. Equally though there 
are limits to this approach because it depends on different groups sharing the same goal. 
Consumer choices made in the developed world may be difficult to reconcile with the needs of 
labour in developing world. With life experiences so different it seems highly unlikely that labour 
in developing countries and consumers in developed countries will agree on the priorities, even 
in areas like child labour. Other scholarship shows that parties who are far removed from the 
process of production such as shareholders or consumers are not well placed to decide on the 
best interests of labour, even where their input is well intentioned.32  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I contend that company success is posited upon finding innovative ways to extract 
the maximum value from labour. Company organisational forms innovate to achieve that end. 
That is the nature of a company. Law reform to raise the status of labour fundamentally subverts 
                                                 
30 The Clean Clothes &DPSDLJQ¶)DWDO Fashion Analysis of recent fcatory fires in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh: a call to protect and respect garment ZRUNHUV· OLYHV· 
<http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/fatal-fashion.pdf >24-27 
31 Jimmy Donaghey, Juliane Reinecke,, Christina Niforou,, Benn Lawson, ¶From Employment 
Relations to Consumption Relations: Balancing Labor Governance in Global Supply &KDLQV· 
Human Resource Management (Forthcoming, 2014) 
32 Aaron Dhir, ¶Shareholder Engagement in the Embedded Business Corporation: Investment 
Activism, Human Rights and TWAIL 'LVFRXUVH· Osgoode CLPE Research Paper 2009 No. 12/2009 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1416198> accessed 15 June 2012 shareholder initiatives to 
improve the life of the FRPSDQ\·V foreign workers failed because they misunderstood what these 
workers actually required 
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the nature of the company, but if sustainability is to be achieved that subversion is unavoidable. 
The key goal of shareholders is to maximise their investment, in large part by retaining the 
liquidity necessary to pursue areas of high value extraction when they arise and to abandon low 
value areas as revealed through the short term information delivered from the equity market. 
Company law reform can address this to a degree but, as I argue here, it is important to be 
cognizant of the innovative capacity of companies to side- step such reform.  
 
The real challenge is to straightjacket investor demands so that sustainability can breathe. This 
will involve measures to halt the pursuit of shareholder primacy through the equities market, a 
removal of shareholder powers in company law and a rejection of the shareholder governance 
initiatives currently dominating the corporate governance agenda. And then the long list of 
reforms; distribution at the point of production through higher wages, hard law measures to 
control the proliferation of financial property forms33 and the public enforcement of a GLUHFWRUV· 
duty to labour and sustainability.34 In all of this the empowerment of labour is paramount. The 
key goals of labour are to progress as individuals, to enjoy stable employment and to work in 
safe environments ² goals compatible with sustainability. As we have seen in the current 
financial crisis, a corporate capitalism built around shareholder primacy does not even embrace 
its own sustainability. It will certainly not embrace the sustainability of people. 
 
                                                 
33 /(7DOERW:K\VKDUHKROGHUVVKRXOGQ·WYRWHD0DU[LVW-progressive critique of shareholder 
HPSRZHUPHQW·Modern Law Review (2013) 76(5) 791-816 
34 Rene Jones and Michelle Welsh ¶7RZDUG a Public Enforcement Model for 'LUHFWRUV· Duty of 
2YHUVLJKW· (2012) 45(2) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 343, L E Talbot Progressive Corporate 
Governance for the 21st Century (Routledge 2012) 225-226 
